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There  is  no  or  limited  consensus  on  the  quantitative  impact  of  institutions  on 
unemployment, which has led some to question the case for structural reforms. 
Recent studies suggest also that institutions interact with each other and cannot be 
analysed in isolation. In this paper, we estimate a standard reduced-form model to 
explore the institutional determinants of unemployment and assess its robustness 
using a large battery of robustness checks. We show that, although the impact of 
each individual policy varies across countries due to policy interactions, the simple 
linear model can be used to draw inferences for countries with an average mix of 
institutions. The model is then extended to encompass systemic interactions, in 
which individual policies interact with the overall institutional framework. We find 
relatively robust evidence of broad reform complementarities. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is a rich literature on the aggregate unemployment effects of policies and institutions 
(see, among others, Scarpetta, 1996, Nickell, 1997, Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000, and Nickell et al., 
2005). However, many macroeconometric studies, relying on limited short-time series for few OECD 
countries,  or  larger  samples  based  on  ad  hoc  extensions  of  existing  data,  have  failed  to  provide 
convincing  evidence  of  the  robustness  of  their  results.  As  a  consequence,  there  is  no  or  limited 
consensus on the quantitative impact of institutions on unemployment, which has led some to question 
the case for structural reforms (e.g. Glyn et al., 2006, Baccaro and Rei, 2007, Howell et al., 2007). In 
addition, recent studies suggest that institutions interact with each other (e.g. Belot and Van Ours, 
2004). Therefore, the effect of one given policy cannot be analysed in isolation, as it depends on the 
characteristics of other institutions prevailing in each country. Not only do institutions interact, but 
they  may  do  it  in  a  systematic  manner.  There  is  in  fact  some  theoretical  support  for  reform 
complementarities and, as a result, for broad reform packages (e.g. Coe and Snower, 1997), but so far 
no comprehensive empirical evidence has been provided to back this view. 
Against this background, the objective of this paper is threefold. First, we estimate a standard 
reduced-form  model  of  institutional  determinants  of  unemployment  on  homogeneous  data,  which 
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come from the same source and cover more than 20 years. We assess the robustness of our estimates 
using a large battery of sensitivity exercises. Second, we highlight the weaknesses of past work on 
interactions across policies and institutions. In practice, we show that following the standard procedure 
of augmenting baseline specifications by a number of selected multiplicative interactions – common to 
all papers in the literature – leads to fragile estimated interaction effects that do not survive to simple 
robustness checks. Third, we briefly discuss the theoretical case for systemic interactions, in which 
individual policies interact with the overall institutional framework, and explore them through the 
estimation of a non-linear model. We find fairly robust evidence of broad reform complementarities. 
The  paper  can  be  divided  into  five  sections.  In  section  2,  reduced-form  unemployment 
equations consistent with standard job-search and wage setting/price-setting (WS-PS hereafter) models 
(e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994, Layard et al., 1991, Nickell and Layard, 1999) are estimated on 
cross-country/time-series data covering 20 OECD countries. Given that policies and institutions can 
have heterogeneous unemployment effects across countries, we test for data poolability and stress that 
our estimated relationship only prevails at the sample average. In the average OECD country, we find 
that high and long-lasting unemployment benefits, high tax  wedges and  stringent anti-competitive 
product market regulation increase aggregate unemployment. By contrast, highly centralised and/or 
coordinated wage bargaining systems are estimated to be associated with lower unemployment. We 
show that these findings are robust across different specifications, choices of the estimation sample, 
data  and  econometric  methods,  including  treatment  of  possible  reverse  causality.  Section  3  takes 
another look at the policy interactions which have been typically considered in previous literature. We 
argue  that  any  interaction  between  two  institutions  is  a  priori  endogenous,  due  to  the  potential 
correlation between each of these institutions and others that are omitted from the analysis due to lack 
of  data  and/or  the  fact  that  many  institutions  are  difficult  to  quantify.  We  then  show  that,  once 
methods that correct for potential endogeneity bias are used, virtually none of the standard interactions 
which have been highlighted in the past appears to be robust. In section 4, we note that such a lack of 
robustness is not inconsistent with theory, because interactions should in fact take place between each 
individual policy and the overall institutional framework. This suggests a way to search for systemic 
interactions and broad reform complementarities. Defining the unemployment effect of the overall 
institutional framework (at the sample average) as the sum of the linear unemployment effects of 
individual institutions, we estimate a non-linear model where the effect of the overall institutional 
framework is interacted with each individual institution, with all parameters simultaneously estimated. 
We find that structural policy reforms appear to have mutually reinforcing effects, i.e. the impact of a 
given reform is greater the more “employment-friendly” the overall institutional framework. Section 5 
provides a few concluding remarks.  
II.  ASSESSING THE ROBUSTNESS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
DETERMINANTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
In this section, we analyse the policy and institutional determinants of unemployment through 
a  standard  reduced-form  unemployment  equation,  which  we  estimate  for  a  sample  of  20  OECD 
countries
1 over the period 1982-2003. More specifically, the following static model is estimated: 
it t i it
j
j
it j it G X U ε λ α χ β + + + + =∑               [1] 
where i and t are country and time suffices, Uit is the unemployment rate, Git is the OECD measure of 
the output gap – and aims to control for the unemployment effects of aggregate demand fluctuations 
over the business cycle, while αi and λt are country and time effects, that we generally capture by 
including  country  and  time  dummies.  Following  a  recent  trend  in  this  literature  (see  Biagi  and 
Lucifora, 2008, and references cited therein), in order to capture large idiosyncratic shocks such as the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the German reunification and the Swedish banking and real estate crises, 
in most specifications observations for Finland, Germany and Sweden in 1991 and 1992 are removed 
                                                       
1 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 









































from the sample, and different country fixed effects are used for each of these three countries over the 
two sub-periods 1982-1990 and 1993-2003. The X
 js are measures of the usual labour market policies 
and institutions featured as explanatory variables in previous papers (for a survey, see Bassanini and 
Duval, 2006a), namely: the tax-wedge between labour cost and take-home pay (for a single-earner 
couple with two children, at average earnings levels); a summary measure of unemployment benefit 
generosity, capturing both level and duration of benefits (an average of gross replacement rates across 
various earnings levels, family situations and durations of unemployment); the degree of stringency of 
employment  protection  legislation  (EPL  hereafter);  union  membership  rates,  proxying  trade-union 
bargaining power; the degree of centralisation/co-ordination of the wage bargaining, a proxy for the 
concept of “corporatism” which has received large attention in the comparative political economy 
literature (e.g. Flanagan, 1999). As already done in a number of previous papers (e.g. Scarpetta, 1996, 
Elmeskov et al., 1998), dummies for different levels of corporatism are used here to capture non-
linearities in the unemployment effect of corporatism.
 Finally, we capture the effect of product market 
institutions, which has received growing attention in recent literature (e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi, 
2003, Fiori et al., 2007), through an indicator of the average degree of stringency of anti-competitive 
product market regulation across seven non-manufacturing industries (PMR hereafter).
2 All our data, 
except when differently specified are drawn from available OECD datasets.
3 
When we estimate such a model, we find that the tax wedge and average benefit replacement 
rate appear to be associated with higher unemployment (Table 1, Column 1), in line with a majority of 
empirical papers (see e.g. Nickell et al., 2005, and Bassanini and Duval, 2006a for a survey). We also 
find  that  economies  with  limited  product  market  competition  tend  to  be  associated  with  high 
unemployment. Finally, high corporatism appears to dampen unemployment,
4 while EPL and union 
density are statistically insignificant at conventional confidence levels. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
However,  insofar  as  institutions  differ  across  countries  and  interact  with  each  other  (as 
discussed in the next section), their unemployment impact is likely to be country-specific. And indeed, 
if we estimate equation [1] assuming that all parameters are country-specific, specification tests reject 
the null hypothesis of parameter homogeneity. Despite this, the baseline equation of Column 1 may 
still capture adequately the average unemployment effects of institutions, i.e. the effects that prevail at 
the sample average for a hypothetical OECD country with an average mix of institutions. In order to 
check for this possibility, one needs to check that imposing identical coefficients across countries does 
not lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of average coefficients. This is done here through a 
battery of Hausman tests that compare an always consistent specification (with heterogeneous country-
specific coefficients) with other possibly inconsistent but potentially more  efficient ones, where a 
number of coefficients (or all of them, as in the baseline equation) are restricted to be homogeneous 
across countries. As shown in Table 2, a heterogeneity bias is found to emerge only for the output gap 
coefficient, while coefficients of institutions appear to be unbiased. This suggests that our baseline 
estimates can indeed be used to infer the average unemployment effects of institutions. This is further 
confirmed by the robustness of our main results to re-estimation of the baseline specification either 
without the output gap variable or with heterogeneous output gap coefficients (Columns 2 and 3 in 
                                                       
2 In a companion paper (Bassanini and Duval, 2006a), we explore the effect of other policies often considered in 
aggregate analyses, such as active programmes and minimum wages. However, due to smaller samples and 
endogeneity issues, their analysis requires specific treatment, and they are therefore excluded from the analysis 
in the present paper. What matters is that controlling for these variables would not affect the estimated effects of 
the other institutions studied here. The companion paper also considers a number of specifications in which the 
output gap is replaced by a set of macroeconomic variables that capture more directly the unemployment impact 
of aggregate shocks and are less subject to potential endogeneity concerns. These specifications are not reported 
here, as they have no impact on the estimated coefficients of institutional variables. 
3 Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/25/37431112.zip. Descriptive statistics and details on variable 
construction and sources are reported in Bassanini and Duval (2006b). 
4 In principle, the baseline specification includes dummy variables for both high and intermediate corporatism. 
However, given that no country moved in or out of the intermediate level of corporatism over the sample period, 
the effect of this variable cannot be identified – even if controlled for – in most of the specifications. For this 









































Table 1), i.e. to specifications that are free from heterogeneity problems (cf. Table 2, Columns 2 and 
3).  
 
Table 2 here 
 
Now  what  is  the  relative  importance  of  each  of  these  institutions  in  determining 
unemployment in the average OECD country? In order to answer this question, we consider “typical” 
historical reforms, corresponding to one standard deviation of each institutional variable with respect 
to each country’s average – so that in practice the standard deviation is netted out of cross-country 
variation. On the basis of the estimates of Column 1 in Table 1, it can be concluded that a “typical” 
historical reform of the average benefit replacement rate (that is 4.7 percentage points), the tax wedge 
(2.8 percentage points) and PMR (1 indicator unit) would lower the unemployment rate in the average 
OECD country by about 0.5, 0.7 and 0.5 percentage points, respectively. These effects are both fairly 
similar and sizeable. 
These results appear to be robust to several sensitivity exercises. First, although the average 
gross benefit replacement rate indicator used here has the advantage of capturing both the effect of 
unemployment benefit levels and duration, it does not adequately reflect take-home benefit levels.
5 In 
order to check the robustness of this particular coefficient, we replace the gross benefit replacement 
rate variable with an average of the two net replacement rate measures reported by Scruggs (2005). 
The point estimate of the replacement rate remains highly significant but is more than halved by this 
measurement change (Column 4 in Table 1). However, due to the greater variability of the Scruggs 
indicator, the “typical” historical reform of unemployment benefits (6.8 percentage points if measured 
with this indicator) is still found to reduce unemployment by 0.35 percentage points on average, an 
effect only 30% smaller than the baseline estimate. 
Second, we check the robustness of our baseline estimates to sample variations. The sample 
and specification adjustments made in the baseline equation for Germany, Finland and Sweden are not 
found to be influential, as the main findings are virtually unaffected when the excluded observations 
are re-incorporated in the estimation sample, and no data adjustment is made for these countries, or 
when  these  countries  are  excluded  altogether  (Columns  5  and  6  in  Table  1).  Also,  in  order  to 
investigate the more general possibility that one single country might significantly affect the estimated 
parameters in our small country sample, we eliminate each country after the other and re-estimate the 
baseline specification at each step (Figure 1). While some countries are found to be influential – point 
estimates of the impact of the tax wedge and PMR are reduced by about one-third upon elimination of 
Ireland and Spain, respectively –, the four main significant institutions (benefit replacement rate, tax 
wedge, PMR and the high corporatism dummy variable) never become insignificant upon elimination 
of any country from the sample. Finally, we check whether regression results might be driven by 
specific data points by re-estimating the baseline specification on random sub-samples of the main 
sample (see e.g. Baccaro and Rei, 2007). Concretely, two re-estimation exercises are performed, one 
on 1000 random draws of 90% of the original estimation sample, and another on 1000 random draws 
of  50%  of  the  sample.  Again  the  four  significant  institutions  in  the  baseline  specification  never 
become insignificant upon random elimination of 10% of the sample. Additionally, they never change 
sign upon random elimination of 50% of the sample, except in very few instances in the case of PMR 
(in 0.4% of the draws) and corporatism (in 0.1% of the draws). 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Third, we investigate the robustness of our results to alternative estimation methods. As many 
of the papers in the literature have tended to use random effect estimators to capture omitted time-
invariant institutions, we present random effects estimates in Column 7 of Table 1. Hausman tests 
reject estimate consistency in this case, suggesting that more reliable estimates are obtained by using 
fixed effects (that is, by including country dummies), as we do in most other specifications of Table 1. 
This comes as no surprise since institutional variables are unlikely to be uncorrelated with country 
effects – as these include other unobserved time-invariant institutions –, a condition required for the 
consistency of the random effect estimator. Another potential issue is serial correlation in the residual. 
                                                       
5  Indeed,  once  separate  indicators  for  duration  and  levels  are  included,  both  appear  to  be  significant  (see 









































We address this issue in two ways. On the one hand, we re-estimate our specification by Feasible 
Generalised  Least  Squares  by  allowing  errors  to  be  serially  correlated  and  heteroskedastic  across 
panels (Column 8). On the other hand, we re-estimate our baseline specification using 5-year-averaged 
data (Column 9), for which we find no evidence of serial correlation, although at the price of inflated 
standard errors, which are at least four times larger. Looking at point estimates, both exercises suggest 
that baseline coefficients are not biased by serial correlation. In this context, the low significance of 
estimates in Column 9 can be explained on the basis of the inefficiency of the estimators due to the 
very small number of observations.  
Finally, the potential endogeneity of reforms is a matter for concern. For example, policy 
makers might be expected to increase the generosity of benefits in response to the perceived need for a 
safety net, which in turn tends to be greater in periods of gloomy employment prospects. Therefore, 
causation may run from unemployment to benefit generosity, rather than the opposite (see for example 
Howell et al., 2007). A similar argument can be made for the tax wedge. In order to check that our 
results  do  not  reflect  reverse  causality,  we  carry  out  Granger-causality  tests  for  both  variables. 
Somewhat surprisingly, they show no evidence of reverse causality, while the long-run impact of 
unemployment benefits and the tax wedge on unemployment is only marginally affected (Table 3).
6 
However,  endogeneity  concerns  may  also  arise  if  omitted  variables  simultaneously  drive  both 
institutions and unemployment. As a partial check for this problem, we re-estimate our baseline model 
using a difference GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) on five-year averaged data, in which 
each policy change is instrumented with lagged values of policy levels. Only minor differences with 
our baseline point estimates are found (Column 10 of Table 1).
7 
 
Table 3 here 
 
Overall, robustness checks suggest that our main findings are reasonably robust.  
III.  POLICY INTERACTIONS 
In a standard WS-PS model, it can be shown that institutions interact with each other in their 
impact on aggregate employment and unemployment (e.g. Belot and van Ours, 2004). In fact, policies 
and institutions that affect the elasticity of wage claims to employment (e.g. unemployment benefits, 
union bargaining  power, product  market regulation) and/or the  elasticity  of  labour  demand to the 
bargained  wage  (e.g.  product  market  regulation,  EPL,  the  tax  wedge)  interact  with  policies  and 
institutions that shift the level of wage claims (e.g. unemployment benefits) and/or labour demand (e.g. 
product market regulation). More generally, any factor that affects the slope of the WS and/or PS 
curves interacts with any factor that affects the level of the WS and/or PS curves. For example, the 
employment effects of a labour market reform that shifts the WS curve downwards (e.g. a cut in 
unemployment benefits) will be greater: i) the flatter the PS curve (e.g. the lower the degree of product 
market regulation), because the decline in real wages induced by the reform has larger effects on 
labour demand in this case (Figure 2); and, ii) the flatter the WS curve (e.g. the lower the bargaining 
power of unions and/or the lower the degree of product market regulation), because the increase in 
employment induced by the reform has smaller feedback effects in terms of higher wage claims – and 
thus lower employment gains. As virtually all institutions considered here can affect the slope and the 
position of at least one of both curves, all possible interactions should in principle be considered, and 
assessing the most relevant is essentially an empirical issue. 
                                                       
6 These tests are obtained by estimating models with two lags of the unemployment rate and labour market 
institutions whose baseline coefficients are potentially affected by reverse causality (unemployment benefits and 
tax wedge). Although insignificant in the baseline model, we also include two lags for EPL and union density, as 
reverse causality arguments can be made for them as well. Nevertheless, their estimated long-run impact – not 
shown in Table 3 – remains insignificant. 
7 Serial correlation tests suggest that autocorrelation is low in five-year averaged data, pointing to difference 
GMM estimators, with up to only one lag for the autoregressive component in the error term, as an appropriate 
choice. We do not implement a GMM estimator using annual data because GMM estimators are sensitive to the 
choice of the order of the autoregressive component in the error term, and this choice can hardly be made in a 










































Figure 2 here 
 
Interactions  among  institutions  in  macroeconometric  equations  are  usually  specified  as 
multiplicative terms, which take the form of products of deviations of institutions from their sample 
mean. In the case of one single interaction between institutions 
k X  and 
h X , this implies augmenting 
the baseline model as follows: 







it j it G X X X X X U ε λ α χ γ β + + + + − − + =∑        [2] 
where 
k X   and 
h X   are  the  sample  means  –  across  countries  and  over  time  –  of 
k X   and 
h X , 
respectively, and other variables are denoted as in equation [1]. With this formulation, coefficient  k β  
can be readily interpreted as the marginal unemployment effect of 
k X  at its sample mean
k X , when 
all other co-variates are kept constant at their sample means. For two institutions 
k X  and 
h X  that 
increase  unemployment,  a  negative  and  significant  sign  for  the  interaction  coefficient  kh γ   would 
provide evidence of reform complementarity.
8  
Undertaking a systematic analysis of policy interactions consistent with Figure 2 within the 
above framework is not straightforward, however. This is because any extension of equation [2] to 
more than one type of interaction should also include all “implicit” interactions in order to minimise 
the risk of coefficient bias – unless there are strong a priori reasons to proceed otherwise, see e.g. 
Braumoeller, 2004. For example, estimating a model with four couples of multiplicative institutions 
(
k X ,
h X ), (
k X ,
m X ), (
k X ,
n X ) and (
k X ,
p X ) would in fact imply incorporating a total of 26 
interaction terms in the equation – the total number of combinations of two and more variables within 
a set of five institutions, thereby inducing a substantial loss of degrees of freedom. In addition, given 
the  likely  correlation  among  these  interaction  terms,  such  an  overspecified  model  would  raise 
legitimate multicollinearity concerns. For this reason, virtually all existing studies consider only a 
small, ad hoc number of interactions, i.e. they implicitly restrict all other interaction coefficients to 0 
(see e.g. Scarpetta, 1996, Nickell et al., 2005, Baccaro and Rei, 2007). However, in order to obtain 
robust  findings  through  this  approach,  one  needs  at  least  to  show  that  the  chosen  interaction(s) 
maintain(s)  sign  and  significance  regardless  of  the  specification  and,  notably,  of  the  inclusion  of 
additional interaction terms.  
In particular, interaction terms including omitted institutions might bias coefficient estimates. 
Let us suppose for instance that no interaction exists between an institution 
k X  and another institution 
h X . If 
k X  is correlated with an omitted third variable 
s X , and 
h X  interacts  with 
s X , then a 
significant  interaction  between 
k X   and 
h X   might  in fact merely reflect  the  omitted (correlated) 
interaction between 
h X  and 
s X . This seems especially relevant in the present context, as it is easy to 
think about institutions (e.g. eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits, cultural attitudes, etc…) 
that are difficult to measure and are therefore omitted from the analysis, but at the same time could be 
correlated both with unemployment and some explanatory variables. Insofar as such omitted variables 
are approximately time-invariant, country dummies (fixed effects) would be expected to control for 
them in linear specifications  such as our baseline.  Unfortunately,  however,  such dummies  do  not 
control for the correlation between included and omitted interactions, because the latter are not time-
invariant, except when they involve only time-invariant variables.  
                                                       
8   A negative sign implies that the detrimental effect of each policy indicator on unemployment is smaller 
the higher the  other policy  indicator, so  that  reforms  diminishing  the levels  of  these  institutions  should  be 
undertaken  together  to  maximise  their  impact.  More  formally,  in  equation  [2]  the  partial  derivative  of 
unemployment  with  respect  to  the  institutional  indicator 
k X   is:  ( )
h h
it kh k
k X X X U − + = ∂ ∂ γ β / .  If  kh γ   is 
negative, the marginal unemployment effect of institution 
k X  will be larger, the lower the value of
h X , i.e. the 
more employment-friendly is the other institution 
h X . In other words, the lower 
h X , the greater the potential 
employment gain from reforms reducing the level of 









































Against  this  background,  we  first  explore  the  robustness  of  individual  interactions  by 
augmenting our baseline model (equation [1]) with any possible interaction among the pairs of policies 
considered in the baseline, taken one by one (equation [2], and Column 1 of Table 4 for the results). 
We then  consider two alternative strategies: i) an instrumental variable (IV) approach, where any 
interaction between institutions 
k X  and 
h X  is instrumented with the product of the deviations of 
k X  
and 
h X  from their respective country-specific means;
9 and ii) an augmented version of each OLS 
specification,  including  all  interactions  of 
k X   and 
h X   with  country  dummies  –  equivalent  to 
assuming that coefficients of 
k X  and 
h X  are country-specific. Results from both approaches are 
reported in Table 4, Columns 2 and 3, with IV estimates being presented only when the corresponding 
instrument is found to be acceptable using standard criteria.
10 Only the negative interaction between 
the average unemployment benefit replacement rate and union density appears to be robust across all 
estimation methods. Finally, as an additional robustness check, we re-estimate the baseline model by 
augmenting it with all possible combinations of two interactions among pairs of institutions included 
in our baseline model (including all implicit interactions, where applicable). Again, the interaction 
between the average replacement rate and union density turns out to be the only one significant in all 
specifications where it is included (irrespective of the estimation method). 
 
Table 4 here 
 
Taken  at  face  value,  the  evidence  provided  in  Table  4  is  not  strongly  supportive  of  the 
hypothesis that reforms reinforce each other – at least in the form of multiplicative interactions among 
pairs  of  institutions.  No  interaction  among  observable  policies  appears  to  be  robust  across  our 
sensitivity  exercises,  except  for  the  interaction  between  the  average  replacement  rate  and  union 
density, whose negative sign is hard to explain. However, lack of robustness does not necessarily 
imply that institutions do not interact. One issue is that small sample size might prevent the emergence 
of significant patterns. Most importantly, the above approach may be too narrowly focused on specific 
policy interactions, while certain theoretical studies (e.g. Coe and Snower, 1997) suggest in fact that 
each policy interacts with the overall policy and institutional framework and most structural reforms 
are complementary. We explore this possibility in the next section.  
IV.  REFORM COMPLEMENTARITIES 
Let us go back to our simple graphical representation of the WS-PS model to illustrate through 
one important example the case for broad policy interactions and reform complementarities. Insofar as 
the PS curve is approximately iso-elastic, i.e. convex in the real-wage employment space, the marginal 
impact on labour demand of a given change in real wages declines with the employment level. As a 
result, the employment impact of any labour market reform that shifts the WS curve downwards (e.g. a 
cut in unemployment benefits) is greater the higher the initial level of employment (Figure 3). In other 
words, the more (less) employment-friendly the overall policy and institutional framework, the greater 
(smaller) the impact  of  a given reform  is likely  to be. Therefore,  interactions are “systemic”  and 
structural  reforms  complementary,  in  the  sense  that  the  combined  effect  of  several  employment-
friendly reforms is greater than the sum of the effects of each of them undertaken in isolation. 
 
Figure 3 here 
 
As already noted, however, interactions among many variables cannot be analysed by means 
of a standard general model, since the latter would easily be overfitted.
11 As a way to overcome this 
                                                       
9 See the appendix for a discussion of the validity of this instrument. 
10 Following the "rule of thumb" of Staiger and Stock (1997), the instrument is considered to be acceptable when 
the F test on the significance of the instrument is greater than 10. 
11 For instance, a general unrestricted model allowing all interactions among observables included in equation [1] 
above would already result in the inclusion of 57 additional variables (since C6,2+C6,3+C6,4+C6,5+C6,6 = 57, where 









































problem, we follow here an alternative approach that is consistent with Figure 3:
12 we estimate a more 
compact, non-linear specification  where  each institution is interacted with the overall institutional 
framework, defined as the sum of the direct unemployment effects of institutions:  






















− − + = ∑ ∑ ∑     [3] 
where  we  simultaneously  estimate  the  parameters  j β   and  k γ   by  Non-linear  Least  Squares.  j β  
denotes the direct effect of institution 
j X  at the sample average, i.e. for a country with an average 
mix of institutions, while k γ  indicates the strength of the interaction between 
k X  and the overall 
institutional framework. The latter is captured by the sum of direct effects of policies and institutions 
( ( ) ∑ −
j
j j
it j X X β , expressed in deviation form in the interaction). Following the above discussion, 
additional interactions involving country-fixed effects are also included in the specification in order to 
avoid potential estimation bias resulting from the correlation of certain institutions with unobserved 
time-invariant unemployment determinants.
13 
As in the analysis of individual interactions undertaken above (equation [2]), for any policy 
k X that increases unemployment, a negative and significant coefficient k γ  would provide evidence of 
reform complementarity, in the sense that any reform that reduces 
k X would have a larger impact the 
more employment-friendly the overall policy stance.  
Table 5 shows the estimation results obtained when allowing for such systemic interactions. 
Column 1 presents the general model, while Column 2 provides the final specification obtained after 
sequential elimination of insignificant interactions. Three main results stand out. First, compared with 
the baseline unemployment equation (Table 1), taking systemic interactions into account affects some 
of the direct effects of policies and institutions estimated for the average country. The coefficients of 
unemployment benefits and product market regulation are virtually unchanged, but the impact of the 
tax  wedge  is  reduced  by  half, and  both  EPL  and union density  are  now  positive  and significant, 
although the estimated effect of EPL is small if the size of the “historically typical” reform is taken 
into  account  (0.25  points).  In  addition,  a  high  degree  of  corporatism  is  now  found  to  raise 




                                                       
12 More formally, equation [3] below is based upon the assumption that that: i) labour demand is close to be iso-
elastic; and, ii) policy reforms are such that do not excessively modify the slope of the WS curve but rather entail 
a parallel shift of it. 
13  This  implies  that  the  specification  actually  estimated  is  slightly  more  complex  than  [3],  and 















































− − + = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑   where 
h
i I   is  a 
country dummy variable – which takes value 1 in country h and 0 otherwise – and  h µ  is a parameter to be 
estimated. This approach mirrors that one considered in Column 3 of Table 4. IV approaches such as those 
implemented in Column 2 of Table 4 have not been attempted here for computational problems associated with 
the maximisation of the joint likelihood function. It might also be argued that country fixed effects contribute to 
the determination of structural unemployment and should therefore be added to the sum of direct effects in the 
interaction term. Yet, this route is not followed here, both for parsimony and because of lack of convergence of 
the related algorithm. However, specifications where fixed effects are added to the sum of direct effects in the 





















i h X X I I β µ  is dropped, yield qualitatively similar – albeit 
somewhat less significant – results. Likewise, time dummies are not included in the estimated equation. 
14 As a robustness check, the specification of Column 2 was re-estimated excluding the high corporatism dummy 
variable in the sum of direct effects of institutions that is included in the interaction. This exercise aims at 
checking that the results do not hinge on the statistical treatment of corporatism which, as a dummy variable with 
little variation over time, has a somewhat particular status in the regressions. The results obtained are similar to 









































Table 5 here 
 
Second,  all  significant  interactions  are  negative,  lending  some  support  to  the  reform 
complementarity hypothesis. From a quantitative viewpoint, however, the gains from simultaneously 
implementing more than one reform are found to be moderate for the average OECD country. As an 
illustration, in Table 6 we use the specification in column 2 of Table 5 to simulate the additional gain 
from  undertaking  jointly  two  large  reforms  that  would  each  reduce  the  unemployment  rate  by  1 
percentage  point  if  implemented  separately.
15  Concretely,  we  simulate  the  impact  of  all  possible 
combinations of reductions in the tax wedge, the average benefit replacement rate, union density and 
product market regulation by 6.7 percentage points, 5.6 percentage points, 12.6 percentage points and 
3.3 standard deviations, respectively. These are large reforms by historical standards. All combinations 
are  found  to  reduce  the  unemployment  rate  by  between  2.25  and  2.37  percentage  points  for  the 
average OECD country, instead of the 2 percentage points that would prevail in the absence of reform 
complementarity.  In  other  words,  according  to  this  simulation  exercise,  reform  complementarities 
would amplify the unemployment effects of separate reforms by between 12% and 19%. Interestingly, 
the largest effect is obtained by combining reforms of the average replacement rate with reductions in 
union density, consistent with results from the previous section. 
 
Table 6 here 
 
Third and finally, in contrast with what usually occurs with linear models (see Bassanini and 
Duval, 2006b, and Carlin and Soskice, 2008, for a discussion), the model with systemic interactions 
appears to account well for unemployment trends over the sample period 1982-2003 for virtually all 
countries (Figure 4). In fact, this model is estimated to explain 92% of the cross-country variance of 
unemployment changes between 1982 and 2003, against 74% only for the baseline model. 
 
Figure 4 here 
 
Overall, the results of this section suggest that reform packages are likely to yield greater 
employment gains than separate, “piece-meal” reforms. Indeed, the impact of a given policy reform 
appears to be greater the more employment-friendly the overall institutional framework, so that any 
reform that lowers unemployment is likely to be complementary with all reforms that go in the same 
direction. However, the magnitude of such systemic reform complementarities is found to be moderate 
for the average OECD country. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we estimate a standard model of institutional determinants of unemployment. We 
find that, for the  average  OECD  country,  high  and  long-lasting  unemployment  benefits,  high  tax 
wedges  and  stringent  anti-competitive  product  market  regulation  (PMR)  increase  aggregate 
unemployment. Conversely, highly centralised and/or coordinated wage bargaining systems appear to 
dampen it. We present an extensive sensitivity analysis showing that our results are robust to model 
specification, choice of estimation sample and estimation techniques. 
We warn, however, that our inferences are to be viewed only as referring to an average OECD 
country. For example, in a companion paper (Bassanini and Duval, 2006a), we show that the positive 
impact of unemployment benefits on unemployment diminishes and can even collapse in countries 
that offset their detrimental effects through extensive active labour market policies. More broadly, the 
impact of a given policy reform appears to vary depending on the institutional context, tending to be 
greater the more employment-friendly the overall institutional framework. The fact that employment-
enhancing structural reforms reinforce each other suggests that well-designed reform packages yield 
greater  employment  gains  than  separate,  “piece-meal”  reforms.  The  magnitude  of  such  reform 
complementarities appears to be moderate for the average OECD country, however. 
                                                       
15 As the gain is larger the larger the extent of the reforms, we simulate the complementarity effect for large 









































Despite this evidence supporting broad reform complementarities, no firm conclusions can be 
drawn as regards the impact of specific, individual interactions across institutions which have been 
singled out by previous empirical literature. Such lack of robustness reflects two main factors which so 
far have received only little attention in the literature. First, while theory clearly suggests that all 
interactions are possible and should therefore be studied simultaneously, this is not feasible in practice 
due to small sample size. Second, many apparently significant interactions become insignificant or 
even change sign when their potential endogeneity is taken into account. This suggests that one should 
avoid drawing firm conclusions from simple models featuring only a few ad hoc interactions. From 
this perspective, more comprehensive analysis of interactions through the estimation of non-linear 
models such  as those presented in this paper might be more informative, at least of relationships 
prevailing at the sample average. 
APPENDIX 













it X X X X − − , where 
k
i X  and 
h
i X  stand for the country-specific means of 
k X  and 
h X  . This 
can be viewed as a "quasi Hausman-Taylor" IV approach. Hausman and Taylor (1981) note that the 
deviation of a variable from its country-specific mean is a valid instrument for that variable when 
correlation with time-invariant factors is the main source of endogeneity. In fact, this deviation is 
uncorrelated with any time-invariant unobservable variable by construction. In the approach followed 
here, the necessary orthogonality conditions for the validity of the instrument are of the type 












it X X X X X X E ,  
where 
j
i X   stands  for  the  country-specific  mean  of 
j X , 
s
i X for  the  time-invariant  unobservable 
variable and E for the mathematical expectation. These conditions are met if  








it X X X X E   
and  










it X X X X X E ,  
which  does  not  appear  too  stringent  if  one  takes  into  account  that  the  unconditional  moments 














it X X X X E −  are equal to zero by construction. 
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two periods as 
instruments
2
Replacement rate 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.21
[6.28]*** [5.78]*** [4.58]*** [3.73]*** [4.33]*** [6.91]*** [6.24]*** [2.87]*** [1.65]* [2.15]**
Tax wedge 0.28 0.33 0.26 0.23 0.30 0.29 0.26 0.13 0.33 0.30
[9.75]*** [9.20]*** [7.94]*** [7.45]*** [10.69]*** [9.56]*** [10.98]*** [5.25]*** [2.81]*** [3.72]***
Union density -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.03
[1.57] [0.22] [0.59] [2.45]** [0.51] [1.50] [3.10]*** [0.04] [0.70] [0.42]
EPL -0.31 -0.38 0.02 -0.81 -1.41 -0.04 -0.66 -0.42 -0.49 -1.11
[0.98] [0.95] [0.05] [2.50]** [4.09]*** [0.11] [2.07]** [1.17] [0.33] [0.58]
PMR 0.60 0.69 0.59 0.51 0.51 0.73 0.69 0.41 0.46 1.08
[2.98]*** [2.65]*** [2.74]*** [2.42]** [2.36]** [5.81]*** [3.45]*** [1.99]** [0.52] [0.91]
High corporatism -1.42 -2.00 -1.42 -0.92 -1.53 -1.47 -1.43 -1.51 -1.42 -4.96
[3.57]*** [4.22]*** [3.79]*** [2.35]** [3.86]*** [3.54]*** [4.13]*** [3.56]*** [1.14] [2.53]**
Int. corporatism -1.23
[0.72]
Output gap -0.48 -0.50 -0.54 -0.47 -0.49 -0.39 -0.36
[14.00]*** [13.06]*** [14.00]*** [13.54]*** [14.37]*** [13.37]*** [2.44]**
Country effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes n.a.
Country effects*OG no no yes no no no no no no no
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 434 434 434 367 440 374 434 434 80 80
R-squared 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.97
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets. Robust t statistics except for FGLS estimates.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. n.a.: not applicable. OG: output gap.
1: The joint Hausman test is not reported since the difference between the parameter variance-covariance matrices of fixed and random effects specifications is not positive definite. Yet, single
parameter Hausman tests are significant in the case of EPL, PMR and output gap, thereby suggesting that random effects estimates are not consistent.
Table 1. Institutional determinants of unemployment: annual data 1982-2003
2: One-step difference GMM robust estimates. The error term is modeled as an ARMA process with an AR(1) component. All institutions except corporatism are treated as endogenous variables.
The common factor restriction is not imposed. Only long-run effects are presented. Levels of endogenous variables dated t-2 and earlier are used as instruments in the difference equation. The P-















































Institutions 0.0555 0.1274 0.1101
Output gap 0.0011
Total 0.0004 0.1274 0.1101
Table 2. Hausman tests of the poolability hypothesis
P-values
Hausman tests comparing mean-group estimates with fixed effect estimates. Common time 
dummies are included in all specifications. "Total" indicate the joint Hausman test for the 
hypothesis that all parameters are homogeneous across countries. A significant test statistic 

















































Replacement rate 0.13 0.24
[4.35]*** [0.19]
Tax wedge 0.26 0.55
[4.95]*** [0.53]***
Interpretation: The table shows that a 1 percentage point increase in the average replacement rate raises the 
unemployment rate by 0.13 percentage points in the long-run in the average country, and this effect is significant and 
causal. By contrast, a 1 percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate is estimated to raise the average 
replacement rate by 0.24 percentage points, but this estimate does not appear to reflect any significant long-run effect.
Table 3. Granger causality tests
***: significant at the 1% level. Robust t-statistics in brackets. Based on estimated models with 2 lags of the 
unemployment rate, replacement rate, tax wedge, EPL and union density. Models include also PMR, one high 
corporatism dummy, country dummies and time dummies. The long-run effect is the derived long-run coefficient of 
the model. Only long-run effects of selected variables are reported. The causality test is the F-statistics on the joint 
significant of the two lagged term of an explanatory variable. A significant F-statistic for the causality tests indicates 
evidence supporting a causal impact.
Effect of institutions on 
unemployment
















































Average replacement rate * Tax wedge 0.003 *** . . 0.6 -0.023 ***
Average replacement rate * Union density -0.002 *** -0.009 *** 65.1 -0.006 ***
Average replacement rate * EPL 0.023 * . . 2.2 0.081
Average replacement rate * PMR 0.008 . . 3.4 0.040
Average replacement rate * High corporatism -0.009 0.042 32.7 -0.042
Tax wedge * Union density -0.001 -0.006 27.4 0.001
Tax wedge * EPL 0.009 . . 0.2 -0.512 ***
Tax wedge * PMR 0.033 *** -0.045 34.1 0.022
Tax wedge * High corporatism 0.050 * 0.037 30.0 -0.335 ***
Union density * EPL -0.004 -0.004 16.2 -0.362 **
Union density * PMR -0.004 0.023 13.0 -0.040 **
Union density * High corporatism -0.013 0.164 *** 159.8 0.115
EPL * PMR -0.111 -1.076 ** 17.3 -0.272
EPL * High corporatism -0.150 . . 9.6 -1.365
PMR * High corporatism -0.410 ** . . 3.2 0.301
Notes:
The table reports the interaction cofficients of baseline specifications augmented by one interaction at a time.
. .: IV estimates are not reported when the instrument is weak according to the Stock-Staiger rule (F < 10).
1. 2SLS estimates. Any interaction X*Y is instrumented with the product of the deviations of X and Y from their country-specific means.
2. F test statistic on the significance of the instrument in the first-stage regression.
3. For any interaction X*Y, the specification is augmented by the interactions of both X and Y with country dummies and estimated by OLS.
























































β  : Direct effect of institutions :
Average replacement rate 0.11 0.12
[6.71]*** [7.58]***








High corporatism 0.46 0.70
[1.55] [3.07]***
 γ  : Interactions between institutions and the sum of direct effects Σj βjXj : 
Average replacement rate -3.29 -3.67
[3.64]*** [4.33]***










Country dummies yes yes
Country dummies interacted with Σj βjXj yes yes
Time dummies no no
Output gap yes yes
Observations 434 434
R-squared 0.96 0.96
Non-linear least squares. Absolute value of t statistics in brackets.
*, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.










































Av. repl. rate tax wedge union density PMR
Av. repl. rate
tax wedge -0.30
union density -0.37 -0.26
PMR -0.36 -0.25 -0.33
Table 6 Simulated effect of reform complementarities
Note: The table shows the reduction in unemployment (in percentage points) that would be obtained from the
combined reform of each pair of institutions, in excess of the sum of the unemployment reductions implied by
each reform taken in isolation. As a standardisation, reforms are set in such a way that each of them, taken in
isolation, would bring about a 1 percentage point drop in the unemployment rate for the average country.
Column 2 of Table 5 is used as the basis for the simulation.
Interpretation: a combined decline in the tax wedge and the unemployment benefit replacement rate brings
about an additional 0.3 percentage point decline in the unemployment rate, over and above the 2 percentage













































The figure shows central estimates and confidence intervals obtained by re-estimating the baseline specification after excluding one country at a time from the sample. 1 and 2 indicates pre- and post- shock periods for Germany, Finland and 
Sweden. NONE identifies the baseline for the purpose of comparison.
Figure 1. Sensitivity analysis by country
Coefficients and confidence intervals at 5% level
































































































































































































































Figure 2. Simple interactions in a WS-PS model
real wage
 (WS)
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(PS1)
employment level










































Figure 3. The effect of shifting the WS curve when the PS curve is iso-elastic
real wage













































Note: Estimates on the basis of estimates in Table 5, column 2.
Figure 4. Observed and explained unemployment changes, 1982-2003





































































Change in explained unemployment rate
Correlation: 0.9581
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